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121 789 An explanation becomes necessary. The belief in the effectiveness of magical practices that we have recognized as steadfast among our herders, and the profound feeling that the forces are not obliged to act because the practice has been carried out are not contradictory assertions. If the forces do not always respond to man's appeal, it is not because the practice is ineffective, but because the forces are superior to man and his acts, hence by definition relatively free.

Now we are able to understand other incomplete phenomena which represent for magical thinking so many problems to which it must truly give a solution.

121 789 788 If the magical action is clothed in the form of a rite and if it must be carried out solemnly and faithfully, that is because the myth in action manifests itself only ritually, the mythic suggestion being expressed adequately only by the implication of the rite. Likewise, the domination of the myth by the grandiose can be externalized /304/ only by solemnity. And as for the fidelity of the execution, this results from the concern about effectiveness, for in practice effects are not produced if one does not follow the prescriptions to the letter.

MAGICAL THINKING.--AN ATTEMPT AT A DEFINITION.

121 789 811 All the ideas that we have brought out in analyzing the postulates of magical action, its methods, the process by which postulates and methods are formed and the ideas accompanying their application sufficiently reveal the nature and internal structure of the magical thinking of the Sarakatsani.

It is a pragmatic type of thought which develops from a fundamental idea according to which the desired effect is obtained by "placing-into-contact" the beneficiary of the magic and a source of influence.

This idea, likewise pragmatic and forming part of magical thinking, occupies in the latter the same place that causal connections hold in technology. It is formed on the basis of everyday experience and by

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121 789 811 deduction through analogical reasoning. Thereafter it is put in concrete form and gives rise to certain postulates which are likewise pragmatic, and which determine the action.

This point of departure having been established, the magical thinking, in search of a suitable source of influence, oscillates between two poles which are not external to it, but are integrated in it, following closely the Sarakatsani scheme of classification of the different parts of the universe: myth and the perceptual knowledge of the external world and common sense. Magic thinking turns toward myth when it finds itself in the presence of fundamental cosmological and anthropological problems (life--fecundity--fertility) and also obscure forces and influences arising from first causes or representing them, which stand outside all experience and all knowledge. On the other hand, it is prompted by knowledge when it deals with all other problems relating to secondary causes.

Magic action is thus organized accordingly. The "placing-in-contact" is sometimes oriented toward mythic entities, sometimes toward perceptible or intelligible elements, depending on the ideas on which it is based. In order to act upon first causes /305/ it is necessary to proceed by mythic entities. To act on second causes, either may be used depending on the case. Hence the differences in the content of ritual and magical practices. Hence also the conclusion that magical action is possible only within a given category of reality, a fact which gives rise to a working principle, that of the homogeneity of the components of the action, of homogeneity of the property to acquire and the property to transmit.

However, magical thinking is thinking "under certain conditions." It is therefore engaged in, and consequently exposed to, various psychological, social and cultural dynamics which render its propositions and manifestations objects of social myths. The latter give it veracity and make unnecessary any effort to verify its statements through experience.

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121 789 811 The result is that magical thinking is a complex in which multiple elements, bound together by dialectical relations, meet and intersect: cosmological and anthropological myths, social myths, rational proceedings and elements (classification, knowledge, experience, judgment, reasoning), intentions, imagination, various "actual experiences" and motivations, affective and otherwise (desires, hopes, fears, anguish, as well as respect and exaltation in the presence of the mysterious, the grandiose, the transcendent), social dynamics collective elements, etc.--in a word, manifestations of all psychic and social phenomena.

All these elements are present in magical thinking and naturally in the action that it determines.

Magical Thinking and Non-Magical Thinking: Their Respective Structures.

The procedure and the structure of magical thinking being thus circumscribed, comparing it with non-magic thinking will prove relatively easy.

At the level of procedure, the two follow an identical process. Starting from certain premises, they advance by successive propositions to a conclusion.

On the level of their structures they are different. The difference manifests itself in the nature of their premises and the /306/ guarantees for the veracity of their conclusions, as well as in the general structure of their components. While, as a whole, non-magical thinking uses premises made up of rational elements and proceeds to rational and experimental verification of its conclusions, magical thinking involves mythical premises, and its conclusions are supported by myth. Between these two extremes there are intermediary situations which minimize the difference. Non-magical thinking also backs up its conclusions with social myths. And magical thinking bearing on rites of simple transmission contains premises and propositions with a rational coloring while buttressing its conclusion by the myth. These observations show that a certain continuity

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between non-magical and magical thinking can be established. Passage from one to the other proceeds from common thresholds and is a function of the kinds of segments of reality envisaged and the kinds of segments of the possibilities /there are?/ of acting on them. The parts subject to knowledge are within the scope of rationality. The parts subject to myth are within the scope of magical thinking. Since between the parts of reality there are dialectical relationships. the same relationships are reflected in the different modes of action upon reality. We shall see in what follows this same phenomenon manifesting itself on another plane, that of the mutual relations of myth and knowledge. As for the structure of these two kinds of thought, we see that the summit of the hierarchy of components is occupied, in the case of non-magic thinking by rational elements, in the case of magical thinking in simple transmission practices by rational and non-rational components equally, and within that of purely magical thinking by mythical components.

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This said, it is time to ask ourselves whether the magical thinking of the Sarakatsani does not indicate a specific mentality? Or, in other words, whether the coexistence of magical thinking along with knowledge and rational thinking does not force us to envisage the existence among them of a plurality of logic or a plurality of mentalities?

[128] Since Chapter III of this part is devoted to the study of knowledge and myth and their reciprocal relations, we shall not enter into an examination of these questions in order not to /307/ anticipate. We [171] shall limit ourselves merely to the statement that these phenomena are universal and not peculiar to the Sarakatsani, and we shall make it clear that they are due to the dynamic brought to bear on their thinking by their specific social structure. This is a conclusion that deserves to be kept in mind, for it will be useful to us later on.

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However, before ending this section, another conclusion, this time methodological, asserts itself. Since Sarakatsani magical thinking proceeds from psychic and wholly social phenomena, it is obvious that any unilateral and unidimensional approach must be excluded if one wishes to arrive at an explanation of it.

That is why, in our own approach, we have not resorted to the principal theories that explain magic. Thus, a brief critical account of these theories appears necessary to justify our position.

SOME CRITICAL REFLECTIONS.

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Let us begin first with the intellectualistic explanation of J. Frazer revealed in his works: Le Rameau d'or, pp. 3, 5, 24, etc., and Les origines magiques de la royaute, p. 35. Frazer sees in magic an erroneous interpretation of the association of ideas by resemblance and proximity, expressed in the more general idea of sympathy (109)

109. The idea of sympathy already figures in the thought of Greek antiquity and of the Middle Ages. See: M. Nilsson: Les croyances religieuses, p. 193, who cites Plotinus, and M. ΨΕΛΛΟΣ: [illegible].

between objects and phenomena--a sympathy devoid of all human depth--which permits magic manipulations. Even in cases where supernatural beings are invoked the magician treats the latter "as inanimate agents, by force and constraint and not by conciliation or propitiation." (110)

110. Ibid., p. 67.

Now, nothing is more foreign to the magical practices of the Sarakatsani than this "cold prescience" of Frazer which, in its generality, has already been criticized by Mauss and Hubert, (111)

111. M. Mauss and R. Hubert: La Magie, pp. 4, 13, etc. by R. Bastide, (112)

112. R. Bastide: Sociologie Religieuse, pp. 19, 28, etc.

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796 128 the ideas implied in the celebration of these festivals.

796 789 182 Observation shows that the postulates and procedures that make possible the magic action, as well as the guiding ideas of their application are present in the celebration of the festivals we have studied. We find here transmissibility, the blessing of the objects contained in the bag of Maundy Thursday and consequently the blessing of production; the opposition of forces (wax candles, salt, incense blessed, which averts evil); purification (sprinkling), representation (the ritual of Saint Lazarus). However, we cannot find here the postulate that forces will not destroy themselves, nor removal, since the religious forces that are involved in the festivals examined are neither destructive nor malicious and there is thus no need to protect oneself from them by acts based on these two postulates. The evocation of forces by magic and by religion are carried out on the same basis (fundamental problems, forces and obscure influences). Contact between man and beast and these forces is established either by mediated contact (symbols) or by representation (concrete example, festival of Saint Lazarus). Hence the principle of homogeneity is likewise found here.

796 811 As a result, the thinking which, in the final analysis, determines the festivals examined, proves identical with that which determines the magical practices relating to the problems cited above.

791 811 177 (773) (789) This similarity is not surprising, for it is basically a question of the same kind of phenomena. Before the Hellenes were Christianized, everything that we have called "myths from which magic drew its inspiration" was part of an earlier religion. Since the objective conditions (state of knowledge, progress of technology necessity of solving vital problems, etc.) were the same when Christianity was introduced, the part of the new religion called upon to intervene in /331/ the solution of the same problems was interpreted and applied according to the same mental process. Thanks to

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this interpretation, which in fact is merely a reinterpretation (5) and

5. External and internal causality in the sociological explanation, see R. Bastide in C. I. d. A., XXV, pp. 77-79.

a confirmation of previously existing ideas, hence a process of acculturation, the new religion was able, on the one hand, to become integrated in a bed of ancient beliefs and, on the other hand, to spread in an environment whose cultural context was incompatible with it.

Let us bring out a final point of resemblance between the magical and religious practices we are comparing: in the religious practices the different objects (such as those found in the first bag of Maundy Thursday) acquire their symbolic effectiveness by blessing. And in the domain of magic we have seen that the symbols of first causes accompany the ancient divinities (snakes encircling the arms of the goddess, for example), that they are consequently sanctified objects. The underlying thinking is thus the same.

Having formulated these remarks, we must examine what, in the specific religious practices of our herders, shows the existence of another type of problem.

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Easter is celebrated with much splendor among the Sarakatsani as it is among all Greeks. At daybreak, the Tseligas and each family head accompanied by his eldest son proceed to kill the paschal lamb. The victim is placed on the ground, its head turned toward the east--the direction in which the headman must look at the moment of slaughter. The east, as we know, symbolizes life and goods; it is toward the east that one turns to pray, and it is toward the east that churches and tombs face. For it is the direction of Jerusalem, of the Orient, from whence comes all light. The headman, as we have said, dips his finger in the blood of the lamb and draws a cross on the forehead of his son and another above

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811 Control over nature, handling of men, these are the two principal poles around which Sarakatsani knowledge revolves, always oriented toward practical ends.

Knowledge of the world and the human condition, within the limits of the visible and the invisible, these are the poles of attraction in Sarakatsani mythical thinking, likewise oriented toward the solution of practical problems.

811 157 The study of their magic and their religion has sufficiently prepared us to understand that the Sarakatsani is not an intellectual, a metaphysician, or quite simply an inquisitive person. His cognitive approach is always motivated by the problems of daily life. The disinterested contemplative attitude is foreign to him.

811 993 Furthermore, this attitude has enabled us to see that once the Sarakatsani has reached the limits of his knowledge, he resorts to myth whenever he wishes to go further.

Thus, knowledge and myth are on a par. That is the reason we have classified their examination under the same heading.

128 The outline of this chapter will include considerations of knowledge, myth, and the manner in which they are transmitted, hence of education and the communication of knowledge.

SARAKATSANI KNOWLEDGE AND ITS LIMITS

811 Sarakatsani knowledge, the totality of "mental acts in which immediate and mediated experience is combined in different degrees, and the judgments and acts affirming the validity of /350/ the truth about something," according to the definition of G. Gurvitch, (1)

1. See G. Gurvitch: Sociologie de la connaissance in Traité, vol. II, p. 121 f.

is already familiar to us. We have found it incorporated in their technology, in their socio-economic organization, their law, their morality

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811 and their magic. But we have not examined it systematically. It is
[128] appropriate now to present some of the aspects of their knowledge which have remained in shadow and which, together with what has gone before, will permit a view of the totality of the problem.

* * * *

805 A first category of knowledge deals with the measurement and division of time, by calendar and by the clock.

[199] In a general way the Sarakatsani follow the calendar of surrounding
805 society. However, among them the year is additionally divided into
221 two major periods determined by the seasonal migrations: the period of
233 the "plains" (chimadiá) and that of the "mountains" (psilomata). Phases in the life of the livestock likewise determine and characterize certain periods of the year. Thus the Sarakatsani refer to the "time of fecundation" (markalos), the "time of birth" (ghénnos), the "time of milk" (ghálata--the period when milk is abundant), the "time of shearing" (kouros), the "time of rotation" (arádhia--the period when milk production has become minimal and when each of the participants of the Tséligato takes turns milking all the ewes for his own use).

805 These divisions of the year, dictated in the end by work, are used along with the divisions into months and weeks. But it is obvious that the first have a "human" depth much more important than the second.

805 The religious holidays also represent some salient points that serve
796 as a pivot for the temporal placement of various events and phases of life. The anniversaries of Saint George and Saint Demetrius, for example, determine respectively the beginning of the period of summer and that of winter.

805 The movements of the sun, the moon and some stars or constellations
821 serve, in turn, as a clock for the Sarakatsani. While during the day the height of the sun in relation to the horizon marks the hours, during

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KNOWLEDGE PERTAINING TO THE NATURE AND PHYSIOLOGY OF MEN AND ANIMALS:

This knowledge has its source in the observation of nature and of life, in experience and in reasoning based on common sense. Knowledge thus takes shape which accumulates in the course of time and is transmitted by tradition from one generation to the other.

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We are not unaware that, according to certain theorists, technology is not founded on true knowledge, for the "primitive" does not conceptualize reality, and causality /353/ is foreign to him. (2)

2. See G. Davey: Sociologues d'hier..., p. 228 f., presenting theories of L. Lévy-Bruhl: La mentalité primitive pp. 93 and 350-351, who says that technology is intuition and instinct, action for a particular occasion.--D'Espinas: Origines de la technologie, p. 47, asserting that the tool is an extension of the worker's limbs and that he never thinks of its effectiveness.--L. Brunschvicg: L'expérience humaine et la causalité physique, p. 92, proposing that the non-civilized order (hunting, fishing, herding, manufacture) without being able to conclude that this confidence is actually an outcropping of his consciousness.--Goldenweiser: Early civilisation /cited in English/, pp. 406-407 who speaks of an independence of technical progress in relation to intellectual progress. For him, the logic of technology is a logic of nature, unconsciously imposed on the human mind by action.

But none of these theories seems to us acceptable, and not only in the Sarakatsani case, but for all human culture. From the moment man intervenes and acts on matter by transforming it according to his own wishes to useful ends andon the basis of physical properties, it is impossible

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114 for us not to grant him the existence of a certain number of thoughts verified or inspired by experience, about his action. To bend or harden a piece of wood by heating it comes neither from automatic instinct nor from simple observation. The latter is blind when it is not guided by intelligence. Likewise, it is impossible to believe that technical activity, like all other activities, does not affect intellectual progress. The life of man cannot be divided into compartments. His different "experiences" act on each other, homo faber /man the maker/ exerting his influence on homo sapiens /man the knower/ and the reverse. (3)

3. See, for example, A.-J. Piaget: La psychologie de l'intelligence, pp. 139-141 and passim.

We know very well that the concepts and ideas of the "primitive" are different from those which cause science to advance. But between instinct or automatism and scientific conceptualization there is no lack of intellectual life; an intellecutal life is exhibited there which truly merits this name, as is shown by the existence of effective, directed, consciously deliberate action. Of course, this intellectual life does not have the same breadth and effectiveness as science; it is none the less of the same nature as the intellectual, creative life of scientific knowledge, though its modalities are different. We have the impression (perhaps erroneous) that the authors cited have never had occasion to follow closely the working technique of a "primitive" and to discuss it with him. It is obvious that technology rests on understanding, the whole of which constitutes a sort of knowledge.

/354/ Knowledge, the bearers of which, as far as these nomads are concerned, are all the Sarakatsani. Its very creation occurs collectively. Borrowing the terminology of Gurvitch, but partly disagreeing with him on the forms in which this knowledge appears, (4)

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4. See G. Gurvitch: Ibid., pp. 128-219, /who/ says that technical knowledge is more intuitive than reflective, more symbolic than effective. Now, we do not see the techniques of our herders as based on intuition and symbolism.

we should say that it is rational, reflective and adequate. That is exactly what makes it effective.

KNOWLEDGE PERTAINING TO THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT AND COLLECTIVE LIFE.

829 Our nomads are conscious of what they are and of the detailed aspects of their life, as their socio-economic organization, their law and their morality well show. They also know that they are
829 186 different from the "others," a fact which justifies their rules of marriage, the prohibition of relations with other nomads, their mistrust of surrounding society--though they are linked to them on the national level.

Observation and experience, and even common sense also nourish these perceptions, the influence of which on individual and collective behavior is certain. Of course, ideological and mythical elements, that we are already familiar with appear here once again, expressed in the opinion that they form of themselves, sublimating /sic: en sublimant/ their qualities and their way of life, which is the best of all, and in their attitudes toward non-Sarakatsani, /which is/ full of contempt, mistrust, suspicion, repugnance (the peasants, prostrate before the Turk, are always ready "to swindle the innocent Sarakatsani"; the Koutsovalaque "smell bad"; literally they are "rotten" /des salauds/; "if you see a Koutsovalaque prepare his grave for him," they say). The internal dynamic of their own group and the relations of their group with others is clearly reflected here.

829 827 Furthermore, the know-how of the men plays a very important role

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in their lives. Clever management on the part of the men, especially the heads of families and of the Tséligato, ensures the cohesion of the group and its good functioning.

On all these points, tradition with its models and its precedents offers a solid and permanent support.

From the systematic point of view, all this knowledge is rational, reflective and adequate. But since this /355/ same knowledge must guide action oriented toward men ("we" or "others"), intuition and symbolism, ideology and myth make their appearance and are strongly felt in their hearts.

* * * *

The very fact of the existence of magical manipulations among the Sarakatsani enables us, without resorting to other evaluations, to assess their knowledge of nature, man or animals as limited. Thus a new problem arises, that of the factors that exert an unfavorable influence on knowledge and its development among these herders.

Now, these factors arise from the specific nature of the social framework and the culture of the Sarakatsani. Actually, their social life does not offer any opportunity for knowledge to flower. Among them there are neither groups nor individuals charged or authorized to spend their time advancing it. They do not receive any training in this direction, and they lack educative means. Moreover, they cannot even benefit from the culture of surrounding society because of their migrations and their isolation. Finally, they are hostile to any new idea, presumed dangerous insofar as it lacks the guarantee of experience.

Furthermore, traditional ideas thwart cognitive advance, but from "within" this time. In order for knowledge to be possible, an adequate and preliminary classification of phenomena is indispensable. For it will give birth to concepts and general modes of operation, (5) which

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811 5. See C. Lévi-Strauss: La pensée sauvage, p. 32.

one could not do without if one hopes to enter this domain. In order that science may develop, J. Piaget says, (6)

6. J. Piaget: Epistémologie, vol. III, p. 261.
--See also the same author: Traité de Logique /Treatise on logic/, passim, and the comments of R. Bastide: Le Candomblé, pp. 240-241.

the human mind relies on classifications of reality, organized "into systems of concrete operation," which are translated into propositions, into hypotheses. Observation and experience ensure contact of the latter with reality. Next, one advances with the help of the "logic of propositions, joining concrete operations by means of new operations of implication or exclusion among propositions... "

811 /356/ In the case of the Sarakatsani, the classifications of realtiy to which the new operations lead have a double nature. First, we find once again mythical classifications. The different parts of reality are classed as wholes, not according to the principles of a scientific typology of phenomena, but in terms of mythical considerations.
811 There are many examples. Let us take the division of the world into
792 two parts: favorable and unfavorable, to which correspond other dichotomies dealing with the different aspects of life, namely:

Favorable	Unfavorable
East	West
Right	Left
Religious	Black magic
Curative magic	Obscure forces and influences
Life	Death
Health	Illness
Fecundity	Sterility
Birth of sons	Birth of daughters
Birth of ewes	Birth of rams
Fertility	Drought
Prosperity	Insolvency
Freedom	Slavery of imprisionment

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Peace	War
Attraction	Antipathy (repugnance)
Luck	Ill luck
Lucky days	Unlucky days

811 Another example may be given by dividing the world into those which can be influenced by that is tangible, as against parts based solely on the influence of creative forces. A third /example/ invites [713] elements that can be included in a single category with reference to their operational symbolic significance based on myth. That is the case with the elements--symbols of fecundity, moon, earth, water, woman, snake, death, grain--united in the mother-goddess belief. Each magic theme or operation can furnish us a category of the same kind.

Next, comes a second category of classifications of a rational order corresponding to techniques, to herding, to material conditions of life, etc., in which logic, experience, causality predominate. The question that arises in connection with these /357/ is to know whether they do or do not favor the development of knowledge. Now, their nature inclines us to reply in the affirmative. But they present another aspect which prompts us to deny them this role. These classifications, built up in a pragmatic hence limited perspective, relate only to a limited number of phenomena. Considered as tools aimed at developing scientific knowledge, they are not sufficiently rich (7)

7. See analogous remarks in D. Essertier: Formes inférieures, pp. 144-145.

even to explain properly the phenomena they are concerned with. All the more are they therefore unsuited to explaining the world in general, or even to help in explaining it.

Having recognized the socio-cultural obstacles to knowledge, we are faced with a situation that we may define in the following manner: the Sarakatsani social framework does not favor the development of

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811 knowledge. Nor does the structure of their thinking. The latter is not independent of the framework. If the framework would favor knowledge, the Sarakatsani would be in a position to proceed to classifications of reality more adequate than those they possess, and even to replace myth and mythical classifications with knowledge and rational classifications. For, it is necessary to recognize that [113] myth represents a solution. It fills the gaps that knowledge leaves behind.

[113] Nevertheless, these last assertions seem to beg the question about the role of myth and the relations of myth to knowledge, which we have [128] accepted without verifying them. This is the task we shall now undertake.

MYTH AS A COMPLEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE

113 538 At first glance this heading may seem strange in view of the fact that myth, seen from the outside, is merely an account found in "oral literature" (8) or in religion rather than in connection with means of

8. See C. Lévi-Strauss: Le Totémisme, p. 14, presenting tha various meanings of myth: "It is a category of our thinking that we use arbitrarily to assemble under the same term attempts to explain natural phenomena, works of oral literature, philosophical speculations and cases of the emergence of a linguistic process to the consciousness of the subject." --G. Sorel: Réflexions...Introduction, pp. 39-45 and G. Gurvitch: Ibid., p. 124, designate as myth the idea which certain social groups, social classes or global societies have of their situation; this idea calls into action and brings about a situation.